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Abstract 
 
Basu and Drew (in the JPM Spring 2009 issue) argue that lifecycle asset allocation strategies are 
counterproductive to the retirement savings goals of typical individual investors.  Because of the 
portfolio size effect, most portfolio growth will occur in the years just before retirement when 
lifecycle funds have already switched to a more conservative asset allocation.  In this article, we 
use the same methodology as Basu and Drew, but we do not share their conclusion that the 
portfolio size effect soundly overturns the justification for the lifecycle asset allocation strategy.  
While strategies that maintain a large allocation to stocks do provide many attractive features, we 
aim to demonstrate that a case for supporting a lifecycle strategy can still be made with modest 
assumptions for risk aversion and diminishing utility from wealth.  Our differing conclusion 
results from four factors: (1) we compare the interactions between different strategies; (2) we 
consider a more realistic example for the lifecycle asset allocation strategy; (3) we examine the 
results for 17 countries; and (4) we provide an expected utility framework to compare different 
strategies.  We find that with a very reasonable degree of risk aversion, investors have reason to 
prefer the lifecycle strategy in spite of the portfolio size effect. 
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 Lifecycle or target-date funds (TDFs) have been promoted as a simple solution for 
retirement savers to invest their savings with a hands-off approach.  This investment strategy 
involves allocating a high proportion of one’s assets to equities during the early period far away 
from the target date, and gradually shifting to more conservative assets, such as bonds and bills, 
as the target date draws nearer.  Confidence in this approach led the US Department of Labor to 
adopt it as a qualified default investment alternative for corporate defined-contribution pension 
plans in 2007 as a part of the provisions from the Pension Protection Act of 2006.  But as a result 
of the financial crisis, this investment strategy has received criticism for not being conservative 
enough.  TDFs may confuse investors because there are no clear guidelines about appropriate 
asset allocations over time, and equity allocations for some TDFs were perceived as being too 
high for soon-to-be retirees.  In 2008, Morningstar reported equity allocations for 2010 TDFs 
ranging from 29 percent to 65 percent.  Noting a 2010 retirement TDF that lost more than 40 
percent of its value in 2008, Senator Herb Kohl is leading a push for greater regulation of TDFs 
to provide more disclosure to investors and to possibly place quantitative restrictions on their 
equity holdings as the target date approaches (Halonen [2009]).     
 Meanwhile, Basu and Drew [2009] strongly criticize target-date funds, but for the 
opposite reason.  They argue that TDFs are counterproductive to the retirement savings goals of 
typical individual investors because they reduce equity allocations at precisely the wrong time.  
Their conclusion results from the portfolio size effect, an idea they attribute to Shiller [2005], 
indicating that most of the portfolio growth for individuals will occur late in their careers when 
they can enjoy capital gains from larger portfolio balances.  Basu and Drew [2009] argue that 
because TDFs have switched to more conservative assets by this time, investors miss their main 
opportunity for capital gains.  Instead, unless an investor has already saved a sufficient amount to 
finance a comfortable retirement (which does not represent the situation of a typical saver), Basu 
and Drew argue that a high equity allocation should be maintained in TDFs, a conclusion 
opposite to the conventional wisdom.  They arrive at this conclusion by simulating the results of 
different investment strategies, in which a lifecycle strategy with a portfolio of all equities that is 
gradually shifted to a mix of only bonds and bills by retirement, is compared to a contrarian 
strategy with the opposite approach of holding bonds and bills when young, and gradually 
shifting to only equities as retirement approaches.   
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 For someone whose goal is to maximize their mean or median wealth accumulation at 
their retirement date, it is clear from historical trends that the best chance for success is generally 
to maintain a high equity allocation near retirement, in contrast with the general philosophical 
approach of TDFs.  A risk averse individual, however, may have a different goal, such as 
minimizing the risk of suffering from extreme hardships in retirement.  The question then is how 
risk averse someone must be to prefer the target-date strategy, and Basu and Drew [2009] 
conclude that the degree of risk aversion would be extreme and unlikely, writing: 
Only when we compare the 10th percentile (and below) outcomes – whose 
likelihood of occurrence is 1 in 10 – lifecycle strategies fare slightly better.  As a 
practical matter, it is very unlikely that investors would select a lifecycle asset 
allocation model with the sole objective of minimizing the severity of these 
extremely adverse outcomes – should they occur – because the cost of such action 
is substantial in terms of foregone wealth (p. 69-70). 
 
 Here we argue that a solid case can still be made for the lifecycle strategy even when 
using the same methodological framework as Basu and Drew [2009].  Primarily this is because 
we take issue with their approach to interpreting the findings and with some of their underlying 
assumptions.  First, Basu and Drew’s criticism of TDFs is too strong because they do not 
consider the interactions between the lifecycle and contrarian investment strategies.  They 
compare percentiles in the cumulative distribution of wealth accumulations for the two 
investment strategies and show that it is only in the bottom 10 to 15 percent of the distributions 
for each strategy that lifecycle investing provides more wealth.  This approach has theoretical 
justification, but it is rather abstract, and another equally meaningful way to compare the 
strategies is to examine the percentage of simulations in which the lifecycle strategy provides 
larger target-date wealth than the contrarian strategy.  For this comparison, the lifecycle strategy 
tends to provide more wealth about 35 percent of the time.  While this is still less than 50 percent, 
it does make the situation look better for lifecycle funds if they are otherwise able to provide 
some assurance against bad outcomes. 
 Second, Basu and Drew stack the deck against the lifecycle strategy by creating an 
unrealistic lifecycle portfolio that is invested 50 percent in bonds and 50 percent in bills by the 
target date, with no allocation to stocks.  Understandably, they do this in order to better illustrate 
the portfolio size effect, but this will be confusing to readers who hear their main conclusions 
without internalizing the caveat that the lifecycle portfolio under consideration is not a realistic 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                      Discussion Paper: 10-11 
 
 
4 
 
example.  We consider a more realistic example for the lifecycle strategy, which lessens the 
differences between it and its contrarian counterpart strategy.     
 Third, Basu and Drew consider only United States data from Dimson, Marsh, and 
Staunton [2002] updated to account for the period between 1900 and 2004.  But of the 17 
countries included in this dataset, the United States provides relatively successful results for the 
contrarian strategies.  Only in about four of these countries do the contrarian strategies perform 
even better.  To the extent that the United States in the twentieth century represents a good luck 
scenario that may be hard to repeat in the future, examining these strategies for the other 16 
countries will also be helpful, and this will tend to portray the lifecycle strategy more positively.  
 Finally, Basu and Drew do not attempt to quantify their conclusion that an unlikely 
amount of risk aversion would be needed for one to prefer the lifecycle strategy.  We will 
introduce a utility function in order to quantify the degree of risk aversion necessary for an 
investor to enjoy higher expected utility from the lifecycle strategy.  We find that investors with 
very reasonable degrees of risk aversion may prefer the lifecycle strategy, despite the tendency 
for the contrarian strategy to produce larger expected wealth.  Across 17 countries and for five 
different sets of comparisons, the maximum degree of risk aversion we find necessary for an 
investor to reject the contrarian strategy is 3.3, which is well within the bounds of reason for this 
parameter.  
 The contrarian strategies of Basu and Drew do tend to provide greater wealth at 
retirement than the lifecycle strategies more than half the time, and they provide the best chance 
for tantalizingly large wealth accumulations.  But to therefore conclude that TDFs should not 
reduce their equity holdings as the target date approaches requires making an underlying 
assumption that the goal of the retirement saver is to maximize their expected wealth at 
retirement and that investors may not experience a diminishing rate of enjoyment from greater 
wealth accumulations.  We must also explore more about the possibility that retirement savers 
want protection from bad outcomes.  In this case, savers may be willing to forgo chances for 
additional wealth if it means having a better chance to avoid additional hardships as well.  We 
aim to more carefully consider the potential severity of bad outcomes from each strategy, as well 
as how the opposite strategy performs when a strategy performs poorly.  In doing this, we find 
that the portfolio size effect is not strong enough to reject the lifecycle strategy for investors with 
reasonable aversion to risk.  We achieve this conclusion considering only the financial wealth of 
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retirement savers, though our findings fit into the literature which uses a more complete model of 
lifetime assets such as human capital and housing to justify the lifecycle approach (see, for 
instance, Kyrychenko [2008]; Soto, Triest, Golub-Sass, and Golub-Sass [2008]; and Ibbotson, 
Milevsky, Chen, and Zhu [2007]). 
Methodology 
 To keep the methodology consistent and comparable with Basu and Drew [2009], we 
maintain the same hypothetical worker who is saving for retirement.  This worker starts with a 
salary of $25,000 which grows by 4 percent each year during a 41 year career.  The worker 
contributes 9 percent of salary to a retirement savings portfolio at the end of each year for the 
first 40 years of work.  No contribution is made in the 41st year, but this approach allows the 
initial contribution to grow for 40 years before retirement.  The portfolio is rebalanced without 
considering tax implications or transaction costs at the end of each year to maintain the targeted 
asset allocation. 
 For comparison purposes, we also maintain Basu and Drew’s four pairs of lifecycle / 
contrarian portfolio strategies.  For Pair A, which is the (20,20) approach, the lifecycle strategy 
keeps assets allocated 100 percent to stocks for the first 21 years of the worker’s career (there are 
no savings until the end of the first year, so this means 20 years for investments), and then shifts 
linearly to a portfolio of 50 percent bonds and 50 percent bills by the time of retirement, 
illustrating the gradual shift to conservative assets found in lifecycle funds.  This strategy is 
paired with a contrarian strategy using the opposition approach: the portfolio starts with 50 
percent bonds and 50 percent bills and then moves to 100 percent stocks by the 21st year and 
maintains this 100 percent stock allocation for the remaining 20 years of the worker’s career.  
The investment strategy is reversed, but both strategies keep the same number of years of 
investable funds held in different assets.  Pairs B, C, and D follow the same idea, but rather than 
having the lifecycle fund maintain 100 percent stocks for only the first 21 years, these other 
approaches keep stocks for 26, 31, and 36 years, respectively. 
 While we maintain this approach so our results are comparable with the previous study, 
we also note that this treatment of lifecycle funds as being completely divested of stocks by the 
time of retirement is not realistic, and thus does not provide fair treatment to the idea of the 
lifecycle investing strategy.  For example, the TDFs from T Rowe Price have an asset allocation 
at retirement of 55 percent stocks, 35 percent bonds, and 10 percent bills.  As for 40 years before 
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the target date, these funds hold 90 percent stocks and 10 percent bonds.  Thus, we add a fifth 
category which models the lifecycle strategy after a real example from the T Rowe Price 
Retirement Funds.  These lifecycle and contrarian strategies are illustrated in Exhibit 1.  For lack 
of a better term, we refer to this as the “realistic” approach, though it is just one of many possible 
realistic TDFs. 
// Exhibit 1 About Here // 
 To maintain comparability, we also use the same procedure to generate simulated 
investment returns using the same underlying data.  This involves creating 10,000 simulations, 
each of which consists of 41 years of asset returns for equities, bonds, and bills.  These asset 
returns are randomly drawn, with replacement, from the Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton dataset 
for the United States for 1900 to 2004.  The simulations preserve the means, standard deviations, 
and cross-correlations of the underlying data, which is commercially available from Ibbotson 
Associates and Morningstar.  Any differences in our asset returns result only from the random 
variation associated with a sample size of 10,000.  In each simulation, the lifecycle and 
contrarian strategy performances are calculated from the same asset returns. 
 Most of our analysis then consists of comparing the distributions of wealth accumulations 
for different investment strategies.  Essential to this analysis, we estimate the expected utility 
from different strategies using a standard constant relative risk-aversion utility function: 
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in which wi represents the wealth accumulation at retirement in each of N=10,000 simulations.  
In the case that γ=1, the utility is defined instead as the natural logarithm of wealth.  This is a 
standard way to evaluate the utility provided by wealth (see, for instance, Ibbotson, Milevsky, 
Chen, and Zhu [2007]; Milevsky [2006]; Azar [2006]; and Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise 
[2005]).  We calculate the expected utility for each strategy as the mean utility from the 10,000 
simulations and then compare the expected utilities from the lifecycle and contrarian strategies.  
We solve for the value of γ that makes the expected utility from each strategy equal, such that 
investors with risk aversion coefficients below our estimates will be aggressive enough to 
appreciate the higher expected returns of the contrarian strategy, while investors with values 
above our estimates will prefer the lower volatility and downside protection of the lifecycle 
strategy.   
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 Utility provides a more enriched way to compare investment strategies than does just 
comparing the accumulated wealth.  This is because a useful way to interpret the utility function 
is that it accounts for the diminishing returns from wealth that people experience.  An extra 
$10,000 of savings will tend to provide more utility to someone with only $50,000 of savings 
than to someone with $500,000 of savings.  In this framework, larger values for γ indicate that 
the investor experiences relatively less gains in utility as their wealth increases.  Another equally 
important and more fundamental interpretation of γ  is that it represents the coefficient of risk 
aversion, providing a measure of an individual’s attitude toward risk taking.  A value of zero 
represents risk neutrality, while increasingly positive values indicate increasing risk aversion.  In 
surveying the literature, Azar [2006] finds general agreement that the realistic range for risk 
aversion is between one and five.  The majority of studies use a value in this range, and where 
there is disagreement, it is generally among those who believe that risk aversion is even greater. 
 In choosing the utility function, it is important to acknowledge a potential limitation of 
these results related to a lack of understanding about the precise way that people may evaluate 
the utility of their wealth.  While our expected utility approach provides a way to account for the 
diminishing returns from wealth, it may not be suitable for individuals who evaluate the utility or 
success of their retirement saving strategies in other ways, and other possible utility functions 
may lead to different conclusions.  Investors could view a retirement savings accumulation goal 
in absolute terms and view as a failure any outcome that does not achieve the goal.  Schleef and 
Eisinger (2007), for instance, implicitly define utility in terms of the shortfall risk of not 
accumulating as much as a predetermined wealth goal.  Not meeting the goal means failure, and 
the degree to which the goal is not met is irrelevant.  As Schleef and Eisinger find, such a utility 
function will generally lead to recommendations for higher equity allocations as retirement 
approaches, in contrast with the lifecycle strategy, as this is the way to maximize the probability 
of success for all but the most modest of retirement accumulation goals.  With this view of 
shortfall risk, the individual does not worry about the distribution of their wealth accumulations 
and would find the analysis and conclusions of Basu and Drew [2009] to be persuasive.   
Results 
// Exhibit 2 About Here // 
 Exhibit 2, which corresponds to Exhibit 2 in Basu and Drew [2009], compares the 
different pairs of investment strategies at different points in their cumulative distributions for the 
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United States data.  We note here that the results are quite similar to Basu and Drew’s, with 
minor differences resulting from the randomness of the simulations, so that when we 
subsequently reach the opposite conclusion as Basu and Drew, it is not because the underlying 
simulations are different.  In addition to demonstrating this comparability, Exhibit 2 also adds the 
realistic lifecycle strategy in Pair E.  Unlike in the (20,20) approach where the mean and median 
contrarian strategy outcomes are 42.3 and 29.7 percent larger, respectively, the differences 
between the contrarian and lifecycle strategies in the realistic approach are only 12.7 and 8.1 
percent.  The results for the realistic approach in Pair E should provide the baseline case most  
worth remembering by the reader. 
 The final two columns in Exhibit 2 provide two contrasting ways to compare the 
distributions of the lifecycle and contrarian strategies.  To compare strategies, Basu and Drew 
focus on the cumulative distributions of each strategy in isolation and describe how most 
percentiles of the distribution for the contrarian strategy are larger than the corresponding 
percentiles of the lifecycle strategy.  This idea is represented in the LCCDF>CCDF column.  With 
this comparison method, our results show that for the (20,20) approach, it is only in the bottom 
14.2 percent of each distribution that the lifecycle strategy provides more wealth than the 
contrarian strategy.  As more emphasis is placed on equities in the subsequent pairs, these values 
decline further, as in Pair D the lifecycle strategy provides more wealth only for 11.2 percent of 
the corresponding distributions.  Meanwhile, for the realistic approach, the lifecycle strategy 
does do better, though still only the bottom 22.68 percent of the lifecycle distribution has larger 
wealth accumulations.   
 Finally, the [P(LC>C)] column presents a different method for comparing strategies, as it 
shows the percentage of times that the lifecycle strategy provides more wealth than the 
contrarian strategy across the simulations.  For the (20,20) approach, the lifecycle strategy 
outperforms the contrarian strategy 32.4 percent of the time, and this success rate increases to 
35.8 percent for the (35,5) approach.  Meanwhile, the realistic lifecycle strategy provides more 
wealth 36 percent of the time.  While the contrarian strategy still provides greater wealth more 
often than not, these numbers do work to even the odds somewhat and may make the lifecycle 
strategy more palatable if it can otherwise reduce the chances for particularly bad outcomes.   
// Exhibit 3 About Here // 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                      Discussion Paper: 10-11 
 
 
9 
 
 Before focusing only on bad outcomes, Exhibit 3 first provides details about the 
differences in absolute wealth accumulations for different subsamples of the strategy pairs.  
Though results are provided for all five pairs of strategies, our description of this exhibit will 
emphasize the realistic approach in Pair E.  We consider the distribution of differences in 
outcomes for subsets of the results when each strategy provides greater wealth, in order to 
consider the extent of these differences.  We consider both Basu and Drew’s preferred 
comparison of the cumulative distribution functions for wealth, as well as our measure of which 
strategy provides greater wealth in each of the simulations.  The results from this table tend not 
to make a convincing case for the lifecycle strategies.  For instance, in the 22.6 percent of each 
cumulative distribution when the lifecycle strategy provides more wealth, the median difference 
is $34,600, which represents just 28.8 percent of the $120,025.52 final salary.  Meanwhile, for 
the portion of the distribution in which the contrarian strategy provides more wealth, the median 
difference is more substantial at $173,800, which is an extra 1.448 multiple of final salary.  We 
argue that it is more meaningful to consider the pairwise comparisons of the strategies for each 
simulation, and in this case the median difference in the 36 percent of cases in which the 
lifecycle strategy outperforms is $97,900, or 81.6 percent of final salary, compared to a median 
difference of $249,200, or 2.08 times the final salary, when the contrarian strategy outperforms.  
Similar results can be found throughout Exhibit 3, as it is the case that the contrarian strategies 
do tend to outperform more frequently and to provide substantially larger wealth when they 
outperform.  Whether an individual values the occasional additional wealth gains, however small, 
from the lifecycle strategies depends on their risk aversion and how the lifecycle strategies 
perform in the bad luck cases of negative asset returns near retirement.   
// Exhibit 4 About Here // 
 To provide more understanding about the bad luck cases when the lifecycle strategy tends 
to offer downside protection, Exhibit 4 plots the paired wealth accumulations for the realistic 
approach when at least one strategy provides less than $1 million at retirement.  This value 
representing 8.33 times the final salary of $120,025.52.  Points above the 45 degree line are 
situations in which the lifecycle strategy outperforms the contrarian strategy, while the contrarian 
strategy provides more wealth at points below the 45 degree line.  When investment returns are 
poor, the lifecycle strategy tends to provide more wealth at a time when each additional dollar of 
wealth will have a more substantial impact on the retiree’s living standard.  For instance, in the 
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very worse simulation result for both strategies, the contrarian strategy provides about $93,000, 
compared to more than $150,000 for the lifecycle strategy.  This is only visual evidence, but the 
utility function will allow us to quantify the potential value of this insurance. 
// Exhibit 5 About Here // 
 Before considering the degree of risk aversion necessary for someone to prefer the 
lifecycle strategy to the contrarian strategy, Exhibit 5 first introduces comparable results for the 
17 countries included in the Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton dataset.  The historical data represent 
total returns for assets in local currency from 1900 to 2008 for each country.  To be consistent 
with the other countries, a new set of simulations using data through 2008 was created for the 
United States as well.  For three different approaches, we provide the median wealth 
accumulations for the lifecycle and contrarian strategies, as well as the LCCDF>CCDF and P(LC>C) 
calculations. 
 Australia provides the most successful case for the contrarian strategy relative to the 
lifecycle strategy for each of the outcome measure comparisons.  In the realistic approach, 
Australia is followed by South Africa, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States.  For 
other countries, the contrarian strategy does tend to provide greater wealth more often than not, 
but the differences between the two strategies are narrower with the contrarian strategies 
enjoying smaller advantages.  For the realistic approach, the lifecycle strategy outperforms the 
contrarian strategy more than 40 percent of the time in 11 of the 17 countries.  At the opposite 
extreme, the contrarian strategy barely outperforms the lifecycle strategy in Norway.  Looking 
forward to the years ahead, we must note from this exhibit that the record for the contrarian 
strategies in the United States is strong relative to the typical country in the dataset, and 
decisions about equity allocations for TDFs must consider whether this strong historical 
performance in the United States can be sustained. 
// Exhibit 6 About Here // 
 Finally, Exhibit 6 provides details about the degree of risk aversion required for an 
investor to prefer the less volatile lifecycle strategy to the contrarian strategy, using a constant 
relative risk-aversion utility function for total wealth accumulated at the retirement target date.  
The contrarian strategy is most volatile for the (20,20) approach and least volatile for the realistic 
approach, which explains why the risk aversion coefficients decrease along each row.  For 
countries in which the contrarian strategy performs relatively better, the risk aversion coefficient 
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must be higher for an investor to accept the lifecycle strategy.  While a coefficient of zero 
represents risk neutrality, a coefficient of one is typically viewed as an aggressive investor, while 
values of five and higher are viewed as conservative.  As reviewed in Azar [2006], a large 
number of studies treat five as a baseline risk aversion coefficient.   
 With these values in mind, a fundamental message from this exhibit is that many 
investors are likely to prefer the lifecycle strategy.  At the most extreme, an Australian with a 
coefficient below 3.3 would prefer the contrarian (20,20) strategy to its lifecycle counterpart.  In 
the United States, the value is 2.23, and in Norway it is only 1.24.  For the realistic approach, the 
values range from 2.62 in Australia to 0.97 in Norway, with a value of 1.69 for the United States.  
In all 17 countries an investor with risk aversion of 3 or higher would enjoy greater expected 
utility from the realistic lifecycle strategy than the realistic contrarian strategy.  We conclude that 
the characteristic noted by Basu and Drew [2009] that much of the cumulative distribution of the 
contrarian strategy is larger thus does not imply that investors would need to be extremely risk 
averse to accept the lifecycle strategy.  Some of the more aggressive investors would prefer the 
contrarian strategy in order to take advantage of the portfolio size effect, but the lifecycle 
strategy still prevails as a better choice for the typical investor. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Retirement savers may have a certain goal in mind for how much wealth they aim to 
accumulate by their retirement date.  Unless this goal is relatively modest, or the person has 
otherwise already saved much more than the 9 percent of salary we assume, the contrarian 
strategies will tend to provide a higher probability for reaching their goal.  But this is not the 
whole story.  A saver who cannot otherwise increase their savings rate or delay their retirement 
may accept that the goal will not necessarily be reached.  It is a somewhat arbitrary number 
anyway.  What becomes important is to find an appropriate tradeoff between expected wealth 
accumulation at the target date and protection against big losses for the already accumulated 
wealth.  Making a “Hail Mary” pass to achieve the goal by keeping a high allocation to equities 
may not be appropriate for a risk averse investor.  Our use of a utility function reflects this point, 
and we have found that savers with very reasonable amounts of risk aversion will enjoy higher 
expected utility from using the lifecycle strategies instead of the contrarian strategies.  The 
portfolio size effect examined by Basu and Drew [2009] is not large enough to overturn the 
general justification for the lifecycle strategy.
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EXHIBIT 1 
Realistic Lifecycle Strategy Based on T Rowe Price Retirement Funds 
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 Source for lifecycle strategy:  
 http://individual.troweprice.com/public/Retail/Mutual-Funds/Retirement-Funds 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Portfolio Values at Retirement in &ominal Dollars 
 
Strategy Mean Median 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
LCCDF> 
CCDF P(LC>C) 
Pair A 
 Contrarian(20,20)   1,987,202    1,462,367       859,499    2,489,639  
14.2 32.4 Lifecycle (20,20)   1,396,650    1,127,481       783,093    1,699,455  
Ratio: Contr / LC 1.423 1.297 1.098 1.465 
Pair B 
 Contrarian(25,15)   2,169,721    1,548,218       893,826    2,686,853  
12.9 32.8 Lifecycle (25,15)   1,614,076    1,248,311       823,125    1,979,197  
Ratio: Contr / LC 1.344 1.240 1.086 1.358 
Pair C 
 Contrarian(30,10)   2,335,808    1,626,323       924,789    2,871,295  
12.7 34.5 Lifecycle (30,10)   1,877,954    1,393,592       867,718    2,307,533  
Ratio: Contr / LC 1.244 1.167 1.066 1.244 
Pair D 
 Contrarian(35,5)   2,470,113    1,688,906       952,944    3,007,577  
11.8 35.8 Lifecycle (35,5)   2,188,141    1,546,508       915,945    2,677,686  
Ratio: Contr / LC 1.129 1.092 1.040 1.123 
Pair E 
 Contrarian(Realistic)   1,956,692    1,485,675       903,228    2,440,347  
22.6 36.0 Lifecycle (Realistic)   1,735,684    1,374,114       898,341    2,142,498  
Ratio: Contr / LC 1.127 1.081 1.005 1.139 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Differences in Portfolio Values at Retirement in &ominal Dollars (1000s) 
 
    Difference (Larger value - Smaller value)  
Strategy and 
Subsample 
Proportion 
of Cases Mean Median 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Maximum 
Pair A (20,20) 
LCCDF  > CCDF 14.2% $61.1 $57.8 $30.2 $91.2 $156.5 
LCCDF< CCDF 85.8% $698.4 $426.6 $169.3 $894.1 $9,430.7 
LC>C 32.4% $368.4 $237.7 $108.3 $472.3 $7,170.5 
LC<C 67.6% $1,050.2 $626.6 $262.3 $1,354.5 $13,790.5 
Pair B (25,15) 
LCCDF  > CCDF 12.9% $53.1 $53.2 $25.7 $76.8 $137.7 
LCCDF< CCDF 87.1% $645.6 $376.4 $140.7 $813.6 $14,025.7 
LC>C 32.8% $366.2 $224.6 $102.9 $456.2 $8,188.7 
LC<C 67.2% $1,005.4 $578.2 $236.1 $1,259.8 $16,123.4 
Pair C (30,10) 
LCCDF  > CCDF 12.7% $38.0 $37.9 $18.5 $56.2 $116.9 
LCCDF< CCDF 87.3% $529.7 $299.8 $101.0 $642.0 $15,911.0 
LC>C 34.5% $344.5 $201.0 $88.9 $424.0 $7,748.3 
LC<C 65.5% $880.8 $504.5 $203.7 $1,083.1 $15,911.0 
Pair D (35,5) 
LCCDF  > CCDF 11.8% $19.1 $17.0 $9.6 $24.2 $53.2 
LCCDF< CCDF 88.2% $322.1 $161.6 $63.4 $379.8 $17,848.2 
LC>C 35.8% $302.5 $169.4 $75.0 $364.0 $6,395.8 
LC<C 64.2% $608.2 $333.0 $134.1 $746.7 $17,848.2 
Pair E (Realistic) 
LCCDF  > CCDF 22.6% $33.9 $34.6 $16.7 $49.8 $75.5 
LCCDF< CCDF 77.4% $295.5 $173.8 $68.4 $398.8 $4,509.6 
LC>C 36.0% $152.2 $97.9 $46.5 $189.3 $3,713.3 
LC<C 64.0% $430.6 $249.2 $99.7 $544.7 $5,878.5 
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EXHIBIT 4 
Adverse Outcomes with the Realistic Approach 
Comparing Wealth Accumulations When at Least One Strategy Provides Under $1 Million 
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Note: $1 million represents 8.33 times final salary 
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EXHIBIT 5 
Portfolio Values at Retirement (1000s) 
(20,20) Approach (35,5) Approach Realistic Approach 
    Median 
LCCDF> 
CCDF P(LC>C) Median 
LCCDF> 
CCDF P(LC>C) Median 
LCCDF> 
CCDF P(LC>C) 
Australia LC      1,535  
6.69 26.87 
    2,242  
4.69 30.71 
    1,897  
13.4 30.65 
C       2,035      2,473      2,082  
Belgium LC         832  
35.13 43.98 
       933  
32.42 44.64 
       911  
42.42 46.35 
C          903         951         922  
Canada LC      1,049  
15.53 33.4 
    1,352  
13.78 37.22 
    1,216  
27.97 36.96 
C       1,287      1,439      1,297  
Denmark LC      1,130  
34.76 44.99 
    1,258  
41.06 44.77 
    1,229  
43.92 47.03 
C       1,206      1,284      1,249  
France LC      1,488  
20.93 37.47 
    1,976  
19.78 40.59 
    1,878  
34.45 42.35 
C       1,829      2,133      1,960  
Germany LC      6,723  
28.32 45.72 
    9,055  
32.35 45.16 
    7,640  
34.64 47.78 
C       8,345      9,914      8,265  
Ireland LC         970  
30.88 40.26 
    1,136  
32.56 41.32 
    1,080  
38.61 42.62 
C       1,092      1,172      1,120  
Italy LC      1,499  
27.16 41.09 
    1,938  
22.99 43.07 
    1,856  
37.74 46.21 
C       1,777      2,038      1,905  
Japan LC      1,684  
21.03 38.79 
    2,274  
22.11 43.35 
    2,087  
32.16 43.14 
C       2,060      2,403      2,186  
The Netherlands LC         803  
26.4 38.14 
       988  
26.52 39.7 
       928  
33.09 41.33 
C          949      1,039         974  
Norway LC         895  
41.3 46.14 
       985  
38.9 46.63 
       986  
47.73 49.37 
C          957      1,010         993  
South Africa LC      2,000  
10.15 32.31 
    2,850  
7.23 36.45 
    2,411  
16.41 35.12 
C       2,559      3,075      2,621  
Spain LC      1,367  
32.78 43.17 
    1,588  
33.32 43.86 
    1,551  
38.76 46.67 
C       1,532      1,664      1,587  
Sweden LC      1,622  
19.45 36.1 
    2,187  
16.78 38.32 
    1,960  
29.79 39.83 
C       2,012      2,351      2,069  
Switzerland LC         660  
30.92 41.13 
       756  
32.99 42.71 
       749  
41.22 45.96 
C          740         786         764  
United Kingdom LC      1,092  
18.15 34.24 
    1,380  
16.02 35.28 
    1,244  
24.84 35.76 
C       1,317      1,472      1,318  
United States LC      1,060  
19.05 34.77 
    1,381  
21.04 37.54 
    1,269  
26.44 39.03 
C       1,301      1,482      1,340  
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Exhibit 6 
Minimum Risk Aversion &eeded for Lifecycle Strategy to Provide Larger Expected Utility 
 
  
(20,20) 
Approach 
(25,15) 
Approach 
(30,10) 
Approach 
(35,5) 
Approach 
Realistic 
Approach 
Australia 3.3 3.23 3.19 3.04 2.62 
Belgium 1.41 1.38 1.37 1.35 1.16 
Canada 2.66 2.57 2.5 2.39 2.09 
Denmark 1.49 1.45 1.43 1.39 1.18 
France 2.03 1.99 1.94 1.88 1.45 
Germany 1.22 1.18 1.15 1.09 1.08 
Ireland 1.5 1.46 1.42 1.34 1.25 
Italy 1.57 1.55 1.55 1.52 1.16 
Japan 1.86 1.81 1.75 1.64 1.41 
The Netherlands 1.93 1.88 1.83 1.76 1.5 
Norway 1.24 1.22 1.21 1.19 0.97 
South Africa 2.76 2.69 2.65 2.63 2.21 
Spain 1.59 1.56 1.55 1.54 1.21 
Sweden 2.1 2.06 2.03 1.99 1.66 
Switzerland 1.8 1.76 1.72 1.68 1.27 
United Kingdom 2.3 2.24 2.2 2.15 2.01 
United States 2.23 2.17 2.12 2.05 1.69 
 
 
 
